



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

INSPECTION OF LAUNDRIES.

CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT DECLARES ORDINANCE INVALID BECAUSE OF DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN LOCAL AND NONRESIDENT LAUNDRIES.

An ordinance of the city of Palo Alto requiring the inspection of laundries has been declared invalid by the California Supreme Court¹ because it discriminated between local and nonresident establishments.

The ordinance provided for monthly inspections, and a fee of \$3 was charged for each inspection. In addition there was a mileage fee of 30 cents per mile each way. No license was to be issued until all fees for inspection and mileage had been paid.

The case arose under a petition for habeas corpus. The petitioner, who conducted a laundry in San Jose, 20 miles from Palo Alto, was convicted for soliciting laundry work in Palo Alto without first securing a license. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the ordinance was invalid in that the mileage fees were unreasonable.

It was shown that the petitioner would have to pay \$12 mileage fees each month, exclusive of the \$3 inspection fee, thus making the cost of the license to him \$15 monthly, as against \$3 for local laundries. It was also shown that the cost of travel between the two cities did not exceed \$1.20, and that the mileage fee of 30 cents greatly exceeded the fees allowed by State laws to other public officers.

In declaring the ordinance invalid and granting the petitioner his discharge, the court said:

The petitioner, as the representative of a laundry establishment located at San Jose, is required to pay for the permit to solicit washing for his laundry a sum five times as great as that charged the solicitor for a local establishment. This increase over the local charge is made up of mileage fees which are to be charged at a rate not only tenfold greater than the known cost of travel by the usual modes of transportation between the two cities, but * * * also more than four times the official mileage fees permitted to be charged by State, county, and township officers.

The conclusion is irresistible that the mileage fees to be exacted for the inspection of laundries outside the limits of Palo Alto are unreasonable in amount, measured by any of the known standards for determining the reasonableness of charges of like character, and that since they are to be incurred, charged and collected regularly and at least once a month from the representatives of laundries located elsewhere than within the municipality, but seeking to collect and distribute washing within its limits, the imposition of an exorbitant charge works a substantial discrimination as between nonresident and local establishments, each entitled to solicit and do business within said municipality upon an equal basis, such as is forbidden by the express terms of the Constitution, to which reference has above been made.

These provisions of the ordinance, being inseparable from the main body thereof, it follows that the ordinance is invalid and hence that the petitioner is entitled to his discharge.

¹ Ex parte Blois, 176 Pac., 449.